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  `Structural	  Realism:	  Structure,	  Object	  and	  Causality’	  is	  a	  collection	  of	  new	  essays	  on	   structural	   realism	   that	   grew	   out	   of	   a	   workshop	   held	   at	   the	   foot	   of	   the	  Canadian	  Rockies	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2007.	  	  With	  12	  essays	  covering	  three	  grand	  themes	  within	  structuralism	  –	  namely,	  the	  formal	  frameworks	  most	  appropriate	  to	  structuralism,	   the	  structuralist	  metaphysics	  of	  objects	  and	  relations,	  and	   the	  incorporation	   of	  modality	  within	   it	   –	   tracing	   the	   conceptual	   links	   between	   the	  contributions	  can	  be	  challenging	  at	  times.	  	  Nevertheless,	  this	  collection	  provides	  a	   valuable	   cross-­‐sectional	   view	   of	   the	   contemporary	   state	   of	   the	   field,	   and	  especially	   so	  when	   taken	   together	  with	  Bokulich	   and	  Bokulich’s	   recent	   (2011)	  edition	  on	   `Scientific	   Structuralism’.	   	   In	  what	   follows,	   I	   shall	   put	   the	  papers	  on	  formal	   frameworks	   for	   structuralism	   to	   one	   side	   and	   focus	   upon	   some	   of	   the	  more	  metaphysical	  topics	  that	  are	  dealt	  with	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  volume,	  and	  in	  particular	  those	  of	  identity,	  intrinsicality,	  ontological	  priority	  and	  modality.	  Perhaps	   the	   most	   significant	   individual	   paper	   is	   Brading	   and	   Skiles’s	  `Underdetermination	  as	  a	  Path	  to	  Structural	  Realism’.	   	  As	  the	  title	  suggests,	  this	  work	   concentrates	   upon	   the	   argument	   for	   eliminative	   structuralism	   that	   is	  predicated	   upon	   the	   alleged	   underdetermination	   of	   object	   identity.	   	   This	  argument	  has	  historically	  been	  central	  to	  the	  work	  of	  French	  and	  Ladyman,	  and	  continues	  to	  be	  so	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  former	  at	  least;	  indeed,	  in	  this	  very	  volume	  French	  again	  states	  that	  the	  ``mysterious	  nature’’	  that	  structuralism	  attributes	  to	  objects	   issues	   from	   their	   allegedly	   undetermined	   identity	   profile.	   	   Despite	   it	  
being	  over	  a	  decade	  since	  Ladyman	  first	  proposed	  it,	  however,	  the	  argument	  has	  until	   now	   remained	   informal.	   	   By	   breaking	   it	   down	   into	   its	   separate	   strands,	  Brading	  and	  Skiles	  are	  able	  to	  subject	  the	  argument	  to	  sustained	  and	  methodical	  scrutiny,	  and	   thus	  develop	   the	  criticisms	   that	  have	  already	  been	  made	  of	   it	  by,	  amongst	  others,	  Saatsi	  (2010)	  and	  Chakravartty	  (2003).	  	  Brading	   and	   Skiles’	   primary	   concern	   is	   with	   the	   premise	   of	   the	  underdetermination	   argument	   –	   as	   they	   reconstruct	   it	   –	   which	   states	   that	  ``object-­‐oriented	  realists	  are	  committed	  to	  objects	  (that	  are	  ontologically	  basic)	  having	  determinate	  individuality	  profiles:	  [meaning	  that]	  (i)	  there	  is	  a	  fact	  of	  the	  matter	   about	   whether	   an	   object	   is	   an	   individual	   or	   not,	   and	   (ii)	   if	   it	   is	   an	  individual,	   there	   is	  a	   fact	  of	   the	  matter	  about	  how,	  precisely,	   it	   is	   individuated’’	  (pp.	  100-­‐101).	  	  Their	  main	  contentions	  in	  this	  paper	  are	  that	  the	  support	  offered	  for	   this	   idea	   is	   insufficiently	   compelling,	   and	   that	   there	   is,	   on	   the	   contrary,	   an	  alternative	  notion	  of	  object	  that	  is	  both	  naturalistically	  acceptable	  and	  lacking	  in	  a	   determinate	   individuality	   profile.	   	   With	   regard	   to	   the	   first	   contention,	   the	  authors	   argue	   that	   the	  brunt	   of	   the	   evidence	   French	   and	  Ladyman	  provide	   for	  the	   premise	   is	   historical	   in	   character,	   and	   based	   solely	   upon	   physicists’	   hand-­‐wringing	  over	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  quantum	  statistics	  and	  the	  apparent	  loss	  of	  individuality	   that	   they	   imply.	   	  However,	   they	  go	  on	   to	  speculate	   that	  had	   these	  physicists	  been	  aware	  of	  the	  (by	  now	  well-­‐known)gument	  that	  the	  statistics	  do	  not	  demand	  but	  only	  permit	  the	  non-­‐individuals	  view,	  they	  may	  well	  have	  drawn	  the	   conclusion	   that	   ``the	   shift	   implied	   by	   quantum	   mechanics	   is	   not	   from	  individuals	   to	   non-­‐individuals,	   but	   from	   individuals	   to	   particles	   for	   whom	   the	  categories	   of	   individual	   and	   non-­‐individual	   do	   not	   apply’’	   (p.	   103).	   	   Relatedly,	  and	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  second	  contention,	   they	  argue	  that	  the	   `law-­‐constitutive	  approach’	   to	   objects,	   already	   discussed	   in	   a	   series	   of	   papers	   by	   Brading,	  represents	  a	  third	  and	  seemingly	  naturalistically	  admissible	  notion	  of	  an	  object,	  from	   which	   identity	   considerations	   may	   intelligibly	   be	   detached.	   	   (They	   note	  furthermore	  that,	   in	  places,	  French	  and	  Ladyman	  appear	  to	  endorse	  just	  such	  a	  notion	  themselves,	  particularly	  in	  their	  discussions	  of	  structuralism’s	  Cassirerian	  legacy.)	  	  	  
This	   argument	   of	   Brading	   and	   Skiles	  will	   have	   a	   resonance	   for	   those,	   like	  me,	  who	  have	  structuralist	  sympathies	  but	  have	  always	  found	  it	  somewhat	  puzzling	  as	   to	   why	   the	   possession	   of	   determinate	   identity	   conditions	   is	   continually	  insisted	   upon,	   by	   French	   and	   (perhaps)	   Ladyman,	   as	   ``the	   most	   fundamental	  ontological	  characteristic’’	  of	  objects	  and	  as	  such	  a	  sine	  qua	  non	  of	  commitment	  to	   them.	   	   Indeed,	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	   think	  of	  what	  arguments	  drawn	  from	  modern	  metaphysics	  one	  could	  cite	  in	  support	  of	  this	  claim.	  	  Thus	  while	  one	  could	  object	  that	  Brading	  and	  Skiles’	  assertion	  (in	  Section	  5.3.3)	  that	  all	  that	  is	  metaphysically	  required	  of	  objects	  is	  their	  countability	  simply	  begs	  the	  question	  against	  French	  and	  Ladyman,	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  is	  upon	  the	  latter	  to	  argue	  that	  determinate	  individuality	  conditions	  are	  required	  in	  addition	  to	  this.	  	  	  Nonetheless,	  there	  are	  some	  aspects	  of	  Brading	  and	  Skiles’	  argument	  that	  would	  arguably	   benefit	   from	   polishing	   up.	   	   For	   one,	   the	   argument	   is	   somewhat	  ambiguous	  between	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   failure	  of	   a	  physical	   theory	   to	  determine	  whether	  a	  given	  physical	  object	  is	  an	  individual	  or	  a	  non-­‐individual	  would	  imply	  that	  it	  is	  positively	  indeterminate	  as	  to	  whether	  it	  is	  either,	  and	  the	  idea	  that	  such	  a	   failure	   would	   imply	   that	   questions	   of	   individuality	   are	   simply	   irrelevant	   to	  naturalistic	  metaphysics.	  	  While	  this	  difference	  might	  seem	  a	  mere	  quibble,	  there	  is	   arguably	   room	   for	   a	   third	   individuality	   category	   for	   objects	   in	   which	  individuality	  profiles	  are	  relevant	  but	  positively	   indeterminate,	  and	  which	  may	  change	  the	  moral	  of	  the	  argument.	  	  Furthermore,	  I	  did	  wonder	  why	  they	  insisted	  on	  working	  with	  such	  a	  strong	  notion	  of	  an	  individual	  –	  namely,	  as	  an	  object	  that	  ``can	   be	   named	   such	   that	   it	   may	   be	   uniquely	   re-­‐identified	   at	   later	   times	   and	  across	  possible	  worlds”	  (p.	  106)	  –	  which	  would	  just	  seem	  to	  entail	  that	  quantum	  particles	   (at	   the	   very	   least)	   are	   unambiguously	   not	   individuals.	   	   More	  importantly,	   however,	   I	   think	   that	   one	   may	   readily	   anticipate	   how	   French	  himself	  might	  respond	  to	  the	  points	  raised.	  At	  the	  root	  of	  this	  response	  is	  the	  fact	  that	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   `law-­‐constituted’	   object	   is,	   as	   it	   stands,	   arguably	   just	  metaphorical,	  and	  indeed	  Brading	  and	  Skiles	  themselves	  happily	  admit	  that	  the	  task	   of	   spelling	   out	   exactly	   what	   it	   portends	   will	   be	   a	   ``much	   bigger	   project”	  which	  they	  can	  barely	  touch	  upon	  in	  their	  paper.	  	  But	  I	  expect	  French	  to	  contend	  that,	   insofar	   as	   the	   notion	   is	   eventually	   to	   be	   rendered	   perspicuous,	   formal	  
regimentation	  will	   at	   some	  point	  be	   required,	   and	  at	   that	  point	   the	  basic	   issue	  Brading	   and	   Skiles	   claim	  may	   be	   circumvented	  will	   have	   to	   be	   faced	   up	   to	   all	  over	  again.	  	  After	  all,	  French	  will	  argue,	  without	  some	  prior	  stance	  on	  the	  identity	  conditions	  of	  the	  objects	  of	  one’s	  theory,	  one	  cannot	  even	  know	  which	  logic	  to	  use.	  	  (His	  debate	  with	  Saunders	  over	  individuality	  is,	  after	  all,	  partially	  over	  choices	  of	  regimentation.)	   	   Exactly	   how	   Brading	   and	   her	   co-­‐workers	   would	   choose	   to	  respond	   to	   this	   point	  might	   draw	  on	  detailed	   issues	   in	   the	   philosophy	   of	   logic	  that	  I	  cannot	  helpfully	  speculate	  upon;	  but	  perhaps	  the	  path	  taken	  would	  rather	  be	  to	  suggest	  that	  French	  simply	  has	  too	  great	  a	  set	  of	  expectations	  regarding	  the	  tasks	   that	   the	   philosopher	   of	   science	   must	   burden	   herself	   with.	   	   Indeed,	   this	  tussle	   over	   the	   demands	   of	   naturalism	   is	   a	   theme	   that	   is	   echoed	   in	   Landry’s	  paper	   in	   this	   volume,	   a	   paper	   which	   draws	   heavily	   on	   her	   own	   work	   with	  Brading;	  but	  I	  will	  forgo	  discussion	  of	  Landry’s	  paper	  here.	  	  Brading	  and	  Skiles’	  essay	  explicitly	  serves	  as	  the	  jumping-­‐off	  point	  for	  Nounou’s	  contribution,	   `Kinds	   of	   Objects	   and	   Varieties	   of	   Properties’.	   	   Although	   Nounou	  perhaps	   goes	   further	   than	   is	   warranted	   in	   holding	   that	   the	   former	   essay	  demonstrates	  that	  ``the	  issue	  of	  individuation	  has	  been	  rendered	  irrelevant”	  (p.	  122)	  to	  structuralism,	  she	  is	  surely	  correct	  to	  suggest	  that	  other	  questions	  of	  the	  intrinsic	  natures	  of	  objects	  besides	  that	  of	  their	  identity	  deserve	  more	  attention	  than	  they	  have	  had	  hitherto.	  	  She	  thus	  goes	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  principal	  task	  for	  structuralists	   is	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   the	   seemingly	   intrinsic	   qualitative	  properties	   of	   objects	   can	   be	   understood	   in	   suitably	   structural	   terms	   and,	   after	  suggesting	  that	  the	  familiar	  metaphysical	  categories	  of	  intrinsic	  and	  extrinsic	  are	  too	   course-­‐grained	   to	   be	   especially	   helpful	   here,	   she	   indicates	   some	   of	   the	  subtleties	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  this	  task.	  	  A	  lot	  of	  the	  emphasis	  here	  –	  as	  in	  structuralism	  as	  a	  whole	  –	  is	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  symmetry	  structures	  and	  the	  problems	  of	  securing	  the	  priority	  of	  such	  structures	  over	  the	  relevant	  irreducible	  representations	  (and	  hence	  particles),	  and	  as	  such	  there	  are	  clear	  links	  with	  the	  recent	  work	  of	  Wolff	  (2011).	  	  However,	  certain	  aspects	  of	  Nounou’s	  presentation	  strike	  me	  as	  somewhat	  puzzling.	   	   In	  particular,	   it	   isn’t	  clear	   to	  me	  why	  she	  has	  chosen	   the	   taxonomy	   of	   relational	   properties	   as	   the	   analysans	   of	   putatively	  
intrinsic	   properties	   that	   she	   has	   done,	   nor	   whether	   it	   is	   intended	   to	   be	  exhaustive;	   indeed,	   since	  quantum	   field	   theory	   is	   explicitly	   in	   the	  picture	  here,	  there	  are	  intuitively	  more	  immediate	  ways	  in	  which	  one	  could	  problematize	  the	  notion	   of	   intrinsicality	   (for	   example,	   through	   considerations	   of	   the	  renormalization	   group).	   	   More	   seriously,	   however,	   her	   presentation	   of	  ontological	   priority	   (specifically,	   of	   ontological	   dependence)	   is	   ambiguous	  throughout	   the	   paper,	   and	   different	   analyses	   of	   it	  will	   likely	   change	   the	   truth-­‐values	  of	  her	  claims.	  	  Since	  Chakravartty’s	  paper,	   `Ontological	  Priority:	  The	  Conceptual	  Basis	  of	  Non-­‐Eliminative,	  Ontic	  Structural	  Realism’	  focuses	  squarely	  upon	  clarifying	  the	  notion	  of	  priority	  that	  is	  appropriate	  to	  non-­‐eliminative	  structuralism,	  one	  might	  hope	  that	   this	   contains	  exactly	  what	   is	   required	   to	   remedy	   the	   latter	  problem.	   	   (The	  non-­‐eliminative	  version	  of	  structuralism	  is,	  I	  might	  underscore,	  possibly	  the	  only	  one	  left	  if	  the	  underdetermination	  argument	  fails	  in	  its	  ambitions,	  as	  Brading	  and	  Skiles	  of	  course	  allege.)	  	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  to	  me	  that	  Chakravartty’s	  piece	  will	   help	   fill	   the	   lacunae	   in	   Nounou’s	   argument.	   	   Put	   (over-­‐)simply,	  Chakravartty’s	   argument	   is	   that	   non-­‐eliminative	   structuralism	   requires	   the	  existence	  of	  objects	  with	  at	  least	  some	  putatively	  intrinsic	  properties	  (on	  pain	  of	  collapsing	   into	   eliminativism),	   but	   ``the	   only	   well-­‐developed	   option	   on	   extant	  views	  that	  places	  significant	  emphasis	  on	  relations”	  in	  connection	  with	  questions	  of	  intrinsic	  nature	  is	  the	  dispositionalist	  essentialist	  view	  of	  properties	  (p.	  194).	  	  This	   view,	   however,	   cannot	   ground	   the	   sought-­‐for	   dependence	   of	   intrinsic	  natures	   on	   relations,	   or	   so	   Chakravartty	   claims.	   	   But	   even	   putting	   aside	   my	  suspicion	   that	   Chakravartty	   is	   conflating	   identity	   dependence	   with	   existential	  dependence	   in	   his	   argument	   for	   the	   latter	   conclusion,	   there	   arguably	   is	   an	  alternative	   extant	   view	   in	   which	   intrinsic	   properties	   may	   plausibly	   be	  understood	   as	   dependent	   upon	   relations	   –	   namely,	   the	   symmetry	   group-­‐based	  approach	   to	   particle	   properties	   that	   is	   discussed	   by	   Nounou.	   	   Thus	   while	  Chakravartty’s	   discussion	   does	   bring	   out	   important	   nuances	   in	   the	   concept	   of	  priority	   that	  remains	  ambiguous	   in	  Nounou’s	  piece,	   the	   two	  discussions	  do	  not	  quite	  manage	  to	  dock	  with	  one	  another	  –	  or	  at	   least	  not	  as	  they	  stand	  here.	   	   	   It	  
therefore	  seems	  that	  structuralists	  will	  need	  to	  bang	  heads	  together	  some	  more	  if	   they	   are	   to	   more	   fully	   develop	   this	   unquestionably	   central	   plank	   of	   their	  metaphysical	  scheme.	  The	   metaphysical	   issue	   that	   is	   most	   vaunted	   in	   this	   collection,	   however,	   is	  arguably	   neither	   intrinsicality	   nor	   priority	   but	   rather	   the	   accommodation	   of	  modality	  (including	  causality)	  into	  structuralist	  metaphysics.	  	  Nevertheless,	  I	  am	  unsure	  that	  it	  is	  this	  that	  will	  prove	  to	  be	  the	  most	  lasting	  contribution	  that	  the	  volume	  makes	  to	  the	  structuralist	   literature.	   	  The	  two	  pieces	  explicitly	  directed	  at	   issues	   of	   modality	   are	   those	   of	   Psillos	   and	   of	   Berenstain	   and	   Ladyman;	  although	   Chakravartty’s	   piece	   is	   grouped	   together	  with	   these,	   its	   contact	  with	  modality	   is	   less	   explicit.	   	   But	  while	   Berenstain	   and	   Ladyman	   provide	   a	   robust	  and	  wide-­‐ranging	  survey	  of	  arguments	  for	  realism	  about	  nomological	  modality,	  the	   focus	   is	   very	   much	   on	   the	   relationship	   between	   modality	   and	   scientific	  realism	   in	  general;	  while	   that	   is	  clearly	  very	  relevant	   to	  structuralism,	  whether	  the	   nitty-­‐gritty	   of	   structural	   realism	  poses	   any	   special	   issues	   in	   this	   context	   is	  something	   of	   a	   side	   issue	   here.	   	   And	   while	   Psillos’	   paper	   constitutes	   a	   highly	  focused	  attempt	  to	  analyze	  certain	  modal	  issues	  specific	  to	  structuralism	  from	  a	  grassroots	  metaphysical	   perspective	   –	   in	   part,	   by	   discussing	   how	   Armstrong’s	  notion	  of	  structural	  universals	  might	  be	  thought	  to	  be	  promising	  here	  –	  I	  cannot	  help	  but	  feel	  that	  he	  may	  be	  making	  things	  simultaneously	  more	  easy	  and	  more	  difficult	   for	  himself	   than	  he	  needs	  to.	   	  He	  perhaps	  makes	  things	  too	  difficult	  by	  considering	  structures	   in	  a	  highly	  abstract	   fashion,	  and	   in	  so	  doing	  misses	   that	  the	   structures	   often	   of	   concern	   in	   this	   field	   are	   (as	   Nounou	   has	   reminded	   us)	  symmetry	  structures,	  which	  arguably	  relate	  to	  concepts	  of	  modality	  in	  an	  almost	  trivial	   way;	   such	   structures,	   after	   all,	   typically	   describe	   structural	   features	   of	  
laws.	   	  But	  he	  may	  also	  make	   things	   too	  easy	  by	  building	  parts	  of	  his	  argument	  around	  the	  rather	  caricatured	  presentations	  of	  molecules	   that	  may	  be	   found	   in	  discussions	  of	  Armstrongian	  structural	  universals	  –	  a	  notion	  which	   is	   arguably	  suffused	   with	   all	   manner	   of	   classical	   assumptions,	   and	   thus	   with	   those	   same	  sorts	  of	  assumptions	  that	  structuralists	  claim	  obsolesce	  many	  extant	  discussions	  of	   nomological	  modality.	   	  While	   such	   an	   obsolesence	   claim	  must	   of	   course	   be	  substantiated,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   Psillos’	   discussion	   focuses	   on	   a	   very	   classical	  
notion	  of	  structure	  it	  remains	  unclear	  exactly	  which	  portions	  of	  it	  will	  ultimately	  be	  regarded	  as	  relevant,	  at	  least	  by	  structuralists	  themselves.	  	  	  I	  stress	  again	  that	  there	  is	  a	  whole	  set	  of	  issues	  that	  feature	  centrally	  in	  this	  book	  –	  namely,	  the	  issue	  of	  what	  formal	  framework(s)	  are	  most	  suitable	  for	  structural	  realism	  –	  that	  I	  have	  not	  touched	  upon	  here;	  nor	  have	  I	  even	  covered	  all	  of	  the	  papers	   that	   do	   directly	   engage	   with	   metaphysics.	   	   But	   with	   respect	   to	   the	  metaphysical	   topics	   that	   I	  did	  bring	  to	   the	   fore,	   there	   is	  much	   in	   this	  collection	  that	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  move	  the	  debate	  forward	  through	  careful	  re-­‐assessment	  its	  roots,	  and	  in	  the	  process	  shift	  the	  emphasis	  towards	  those	  concepts	  that	  have	  not	  so	  far	  received	  the	  attention	  that	  they	  arguably	  deserve.	  	  In	  any	  case,	  having	  the	   various	   and	   sometimes	   divergent	   positions	   gathered	   together	   in	   one	   place	  will	   no	   doubt	   help	   followers	   of	   structuralism	   stay	   oriented	  within	   the	   shifting	  sands	  of	   this	  subject,	  and	  we	  may	  value	  collections	  such	  as	  these	   for	  that	  more	  modest	  reason	  as	  well.	  	  *With	  thanks	  to	  all	  at	  the	  Leeds	  philosophy	  of	  physics	  reading	  group.	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